Israel, Turkiye and the new regional reordering
Israel's attack on a Syrian airbase has drawn condemnations from the US, UK, and UN, and reflects a shift in dynamics between Turkiye and Israel. Turkiye refrained from escalating and instead framed the issue as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the re…
Intelligence analysis by Llama
Israel's attack on a Syrian airbase has drawn condemnations from the US, UK, and UN, and reflects a shift in dynamics between Turkiye and Israel. Turkiye refrained from escalating and instead framed the issue as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus.
Imagine a big game of chess where countries are the players. Israel and Turkiye are like two players who used to be friends but now have different ideas about how the game should be played. Israel wants to be the boss and control the other players, but Turkiye wants to be a team player and work with others. This makes the game very complicated and could lead to big problems.
Analysis
The Israeli Attack and the Shift in Dynamics Between Turkiye and Israel
The Israeli attack on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria on August 18, 2026, has drawn condemnations from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, as well as regional countries. The Israeli government claimed that it had intelligence of Turkish military movement to the site. However, US intelligence conducted its own due diligence and found no basis for the claim.
The incident not only reflects a shift in the dynamics between Turkiye and Israel but also signals a regional reordering that the latter is no longer at the centre of. The Turkish response to the attack was significant, as Ankara refrained from escalating and instead provided an off-ramp out of the crisis. It framed the issue not in bilateral terms but as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus.
The International Consensus on Syria
From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East, Turkiye and Israel have conflicting policies, priorities, and threat perceptions. Despite this, Syria serves as a microcosm of Turkiye and Israel's visions of the regional order. Ankara wants its southern neighbour to be centralised, stable, and capable militarily. In contrast, Israel wants a Syria that is weak, fragmented, and bereft of serious military might.
The Failure of the Abrahamic Vision of Regional Order
The recent Mecca Pact, which brought together Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, is not inherently anti-Israel. However, it represents a regional shift that signals the failure of the order envisioned by the Abraham Accords, or similar initiatives such as India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or the strategic partnership between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US known as I2U2.
The Abrahamic vision of the regional order was premised on Arab-Israeli normalisation and cooperation under the US security umbrella. Hard containment of Iran, soft containment of Turkiye, and de-emphasising the Palestinian issue were also part of the same vision. However, with its aggressive and revisionist policies, Israel has deepened the prospect of its regional isolation, increased the cost of any normalisation, and doomed this Abrahamic – or Israeli-centric – vision of regional order.
Key points
- Israel's attack on a Syrian airbase has drawn condemnations from the US, UK, and UN.
- Turkiye refrained from escalating and instead framed the issue as one between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus.
- The incident signals a regional reordering that Israel is no longer at the centre of.
- The Abrahamic vision of regional order has failed due to Israel's aggressive and revisionist policies.
If the US throws its weight behind a trilateral deconfliction mechanism, it could help prevent further escalation between Turkiye and Israel. This would require the US to rein in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's aggressive policies and promote a more stable and centralised Syria.
If Israel continues to pursue its aggressive and revisionist policies, it could deepen its regional isolation and increase the cost of any normalisation. This could lead to a destabilisation of the region and a rise in non-state actors and radicalism.
